Mutual majority criterion: Difference between revisions
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[[Borda-Elimination]], [[Bucklin]], [[Coombs]], [[IRV]], [[Kemeny-Young]], [[Nanson (original)]], [[Raynaud|Pairwise-Elimination]], [[Ranked Pairs]], [[Schulze method|Schulze]], [[Smith//Minmax]], [[Descending Solid Coalitions]] |
[[Borda-Elimination]], [[Bucklin voting|Bucklin]], [[Coombs]], [[IRV]], [[Kemeny-Young]], [[Nanson (original)]], [[Raynaud|Pairwise-Elimination]], [[Ranked Pairs]], [[Schulze method|Schulze]], [[Smith//Minimax|Smith//Minmax]], [[Descending Solid Coalitions]] |
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Systems which fail: |
Systems which fail: |
Revision as of 19:37, 18 August 2005
The Mutual majority criterion is a criterion for evaluating voting systems. It applies to ranked ballot elections. It can be stated as follows:
- If there is a majority of voters for which it is true that they all rank a set of candidates above all others, then one of these candidates must win.
This is often called Majority criterion for solid coalitions or simply Majority criterion.
Systems which pass:
Borda-Elimination, Bucklin, Coombs, IRV, Kemeny-Young, Nanson (original), Pairwise-Elimination, Ranked Pairs, Schulze, Smith//Minmax, Descending Solid Coalitions
Systems which fail: