Proportional representation: Difference between revisions

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===Comparison===
 
[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]] is praised for ensuring thatensures voters get what would intuitively be considered an at least somewhat proportional outcome, but is criticized for focusing too much on giving a voter one "best" representative, rather than letting that voter have influence in electing several representatives.
 
Many of the properties of these systems can be derived from their party list simplifications. The [[Balinski–Young theorem]] implies that not all desirable properties are possible in the same system. Theile type systems reduce to [[Highest averages method|divisor methods]] which means that adding voters or winners will not change results in undesirable ways. The other three reduce to [[Largest remainder methods]] which obey Quota Rules but adding voters or winners may change outcomes in undesirable ways. One such way is failure of [[Participation criterion]]. It is not clear which is a fundamentally better choice since Quota Rules are intimately tied with some definitions of proportionality.
 
=== Criticisms ===
Some common criticisms of [[STV]] (which would likely hold for many other nonpartisan PR methods) are that it is too complex in terms of filling out the ballot and tabulation, that it takes too long to count compared to partisan PR methods (many of which are [[Precinctprecinct-summable]] due to being based on [[FPTP]]), and that it can even make representatives parochialist and focused on representing their multi-member districts rather than the state or nation as a whole. Note that this last criticism is inapplicable when nonpartisan PR methods are proposed for a single national/statewide district, though this is usually not proposed or done (with the exception of some 21-seaters in Australia).
 
== Alternatives ==
 
Due to the ambiguity and difficulty in the definition of Proportional Representation academic work often uses another more robust metric. This is the concept of a [[Stable Winner Set]]. The requirement that a system always produces a stable winner set when there exists one is definable in all possible systems. This makes it more useful than the concept of Proportional Representation which is typically tied to Partisan voting and as such cannot be defined for all systems. This concept evolved out of the economics field of [[Participatoryparticipatory budgeting]] but can be equally suitable in Social Choice Theory. A less strict and more practicalweaker version of this is given by [[Justifiedjustified representation]].
 
== Definitions ==
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The party list case of a proportional voting method is what type of [[Party list]] allocation method it becomes equivalent to when voters vote in a "Party list"-like manner (i.e. they give maximal support to some candidates and no support to all others, as if voting on party lines). Generally, the party list case of a PR method will either be a [[Divisor method|divisor method]], such as [[D'Hondt]], or a [[Largest remainder method]], such as [[Hamilton]]. PR methods can generally be split into two categories: sequential (one winner is elected at a time) and optimal (every possible winner set is compared to each other and the best one is chosen).
 
Almost all sequential PR methods can have a single-winner method done to elect the final seat; this is because at that point there is only one seat left to elect. See [[Single transferable vote#Deciding the election of the final seat]] for an example. [[Condorcet methods]] and [[STAR voting]] can be made to work with PR methods in this way.
 
See the [[combinatorics]] article for more information.
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** [https://fairvote.org/archives/proportional-representation-library/ FairVote]
** [http://web.archive.org/web/20161228205929/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/prlib.htm Mount Holyoke College]
* [https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/29291 Scholarly Community Encyclopedia]
 
== References ==