Truncation: Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 10:10, 6 September 2020

Truncation is when a voter votes honestly, but doesn't show some of their lower preferences. In the extreme case, it becomes bullet voting, where the voter only indicates their first preference. It is often done for Strategic voting purposes.

Notes

A variant of the Participation criterion or Independence of Irrelevant Ballots offers one way of justifying Range voting being no worse than FPTP: voters can never be hurt by casting an FPTP-style vote (bullet voting) relative to not voting. Many other voting methods, such as IRV and STAR (and possibly Condorcet fail even this weaker version of Participation. Example for IRV:

30+2: A>B 
31: B 
49: C

If 2 of the 32: A>B voters show up and bullet vote A, then B is eliminated and then C wins. But if they don't vote, then A is eliminated and then B wins.

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-Truncation is when a voter votes honestly, but doesn't show some of their lower preferences. In the extreme case, it becomes bullet voting, where the voter only indicates their [[1st choice]]. It is often done for [[Strategic voting]] purposes.
+Truncation is when a voter votes honestly, but doesn't show some of their lower preferences. In the extreme case, it becomes bullet voting, where the voter only indicates their [[first preference]]. It is often done for [[Strategic voting]] purposes.
 == Notes ==
-A variant of the [[Participation criterion]] or [[Independence of Irrelevant Ballots]] offers one way of justifying [[Score voting]] being no worse than [[FPTP]]: voters can never be hurt by casting an FPTP-style vote ([[bullet voting]]) relative to not voting. Many other voting methods, such as [[IRV]] and [[STAR]] (and possibly [[Condorcet]] fail even this weaker version of Participation. Example for IRV:
+A variant of the [[Participation criterion]] or [[Independence of Irrelevant Ballots]] offers one way of justifying [[Range voting]] being no worse than [[FPTP]]: voters can never be hurt by casting an FPTP-style vote ([[bullet voting]]) relative to not voting. Many other voting methods, such as [[IRV]] and [[STAR]] (and possibly [[Condorcet]] fail even this weaker version of Participation. Example for IRV:
+{{ballots|
-+2 A>B
++2: A>B
+: B
+: C
+}}
+If 2 of the 32: A>B voters show up and bullet vote A, then B is eliminated and then C wins. But if they don't vote, then A is eliminated and then B wins.
-B
+[[Category:Voting theory]]
-C
-If 2 of the 32 A>B voters show up and bullet vote A, then B is eliminated and then C wins. But if they don't vote, then A is eliminated and then B wins.
-<br />