Difference between revisions of "Chicken Dilemma Criterion"
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| − | In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD) defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' co-operativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the | + | In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' co-operativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose". |
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ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]] | ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]] | ||
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| + | ---- | ||
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| + | Because CD is so simple, such a simple situaton, could there be another | ||
| + | simple implmentation of it? | ||
| + | |||
| + | ...maybe one that doesn't speak of numbers of voters in the factions? | ||
| + | |||
| + | CD is sufficient, as-is, but here is a non-numerical definition: | ||
| + | |||
| + | == CD2 ; == | ||
| + | |||
| + | '''Supporting definition:''' | ||
| + | |||
| + | The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are | ||
| + | the voters who vote B over everone else. The C voters are the voters | ||
| + | who vote C over everyone else. | ||
| + | |||
| + | '''Premise:''' | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1. There are 3 candidate: A, B, and C. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2. If the A voters and B voters all voted both A and B over C, then C | ||
| + | couldn't win. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 3. The ballot set is such that if C withdrew from the election and the | ||
| + | count, A would win. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 4. The A voters vote B over C. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 5. The B voters don't vote A over anyone. | ||
| + | |||
| + | '''Requirement:''' | ||
| + | |||
| + | B doesn't win. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [end of CD2 definition] | ||
Revision as of 04:08, 19 January 2014
Definition
Supporting definition:
The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.
Premise:
1. There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
2. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.
3. The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.
4. The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.
5. None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.
Requirement:
B doesn't win.
[end of CD definition]
In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' co-operativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose".
Some methods that pass the Chicken Dilemma Criterion:
ICT, Symmetrical ICT, MMPO, MDDTR, IRV, Benham's method, Woodall's method
Because CD is so simple, such a simple situaton, could there be another simple implmentation of it?
...maybe one that doesn't speak of numbers of voters in the factions?
CD is sufficient, as-is, but here is a non-numerical definition:
CD2 ;
Supporting definition:
The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.
Premise:
1. There are 3 candidate: A, B, and C.
2. If the A voters and B voters all voted both A and B over C, then C couldn't win.
3. The ballot set is such that if C withdrew from the election and the count, A would win.
4. The A voters vote B over C.
5. The B voters don't vote A over anyone.
Requirement:
B doesn't win.
[end of CD2 definition]
