Display title | Condorcet//Approval |
Default sort key | Condorcet//Approval |
Page length (in bytes) | 8,788 |
Page ID | 91 |
Page content language | en - English |
Page content model | wikitext |
Indexing by robots | Allowed |
Number of redirects to this page | 3 |
Counted as a content page | Yes |
Number of subpages of this page | 0 (0 redirects; 0 non-redirects) |
Edit | Allow all users (infinite) |
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Page creator | imported>KVenzke |
Date of page creation | 03:04, 29 July 2005 |
Latest editor | BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk | contribs) |
Date of latest edit | 01:10, 2 April 2020 |
Total number of edits | 25 |
Total number of distinct authors | 6 |
Recent number of edits (within past 180 days) | 0 |
Recent number of distinct authors | 0 |
Transcluded template (1) | Template used on this page:
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Description | Content |
Article description: (description ) This attribute controls the content of the description and og:description elements. | Condorcet//Approval or C//A is an election method by which the Condorcet winner is elected if one exists, otherwise the approval winner is elected. Approval could be specified in various ways. The double-slash notation signifies that one eliminates all losers of the first step before performing the second step. It is also possible to limit contenders to members of the Smith or Schwartz set, resulting in Smith//Approval or Schwartz//Approval. |