Participation criterion

Statement of Criterion

Adding one or more ballots that vote X over Y should never change the winner from X to Y.

Weak Participation criterion

By voting, you cannot cause X to be elected instead of Y (with all other winners staying the same) if you scored Y higher than X. One consequence of this criteria, is that by voting, you can never get a result that is less desirable according to your ballot then a result that is more desirable according to your ballot. The difference between this criterion and the strong Strong Participation criterion is that because unless there was an infinite range for you to score candidates on (you are scoring candidates on infinite sliding bars), due to the approximations you make when expressing your utilities on a finite number of scores, your ballot can disagree with you about whether outcome X is better than outcome Y.

(Described here: "Optimal proportional representation" multiwinner voting systems I: methods, algorithms, advantages, and inherent flaws)

Complying Methods

Plurality voting, Approval voting, Cardinal Ratings, Borda count, and Woodall's DAC and DSC methods all pass the Participation Criterion. Condorcet methods, Majority Choice Approval, and IRV fail.

Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org

See also

• Voting system
• Monotonicity criterion
• Condorcet Criterion
• Generalized Condorcet criterion
• Strategy-Free criterion
• Generalized Strategy-Free criterion
• Strong Defensive Strategy criterion
• Weak Defensive Strategy criterion
• Favorite Betrayal criterion
• Summability criterion

External links

• Election Methods Education and Research Group
• Woodall's DAC method

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