Difference between revisions of "Strategy-free criterion"
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prefers this candidate to another candidate, then the other candidate should
not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]▼
▲<h4 class=left>Complying Methods</h4>
possibly <em>not</em> be preferred by a majority of voters over any
other candidate. The key is that some voters may have no preference
prefer the opposite, with the other 15 having no preference between the
two. In that case, it is not true that a majority of voters prefer the
Condorcet candidate over the other candidate, and SFC does not apply.
two types of insincere votes: false preferences and truncated
preferences. Voters <em>truncate</em> by terminating their rank list
voter's true preferences are (A,B,C,D). The vote (A) or (A,B) would be a
truncated vote, and the vote (B,A,C) or (A,C,B) would be a falsified
another particular candidate vote sincerely (neither falsify nor
truncate their preferences), and it also requires that no other voter
that is more likely to backfire than to succeed.) The significance of
the SFC guarantee is that the majority has no need for defensive
strategy, hence the name Strategy-Free Criterion.
Condorcet and Generalized Condorcet Criteria (CC and GCC) above.
Although compliance with CC and GCC are important, those criteria apply
reasonable conditions, a majority of voters have no incentive to vote
insincerely. The fact that [[Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping]] also complies with SFC
therefore enhances the significance of CC and GCC considerably.
''Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org''
▲[[Category:Voting system criteria]]