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editsDifference between revisions of "Proportionality for Solid Coalitions"
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== Notes ==
With rated ballots, it is possible for a voter to express lessthanfull support for any candidate. Because of this, one way to apply PSC to rated ballots and thus cardinal PR methods would be to require that every voter in each solid coalition give at least one candidate in their coalition the maximum score. An even stricter requirement could be to require them to give every candidate in the coalition a perfect score, though this could instead be thought of as a genuinely slightly weaker form of PSC; it is already satisfied by [[SMV]]. This is modeled off of the [[Majority criterion for rated ballotsmajority criterion for rated ballots]].
DroopPSC implies HarePSC, since a Hare quota is simply a large Droop quota, but the same doesn't hold the other way around. HarePSC is equivalent to the unanimity criterion and DroopPSC to the mutual majority criterion in the singlewinner case. Note that this means cardinal PR methods can only pass HarePSC and not DroopPSC in order to reduce to cardinal methods that fail the mutual majority criterion in the singlewinner case, which is most of them.
