Stable Voting is a Condorcet method devised by Wesley H. Holliday and Eric Pacuit. It obeys the stability for winners with tiebreaking criterion:
If an alternative X wins after another alternative Y is eliminated from the election, and X beats Y pairwise, then X must still win with Y included unless there exists some other candidate X' with the same claim to being the winner. In such a case, a tiebreaker may choose between X and X'.
It also has a very low tie rate, making it useful for elections with a much larger number of candidates than voters.
It passes the Smith criterion and the Condorcet loser criterion. It fails the monotonicity criterion.
There is a web page available for running Stable Voting elections: https://stablevoting.org/.
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- ↑ Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2021-08-01). "Stable Voting". arXiv:2108.00542 [econ.TH].