View source for Utilitarian Voting

==Discussion==
This voting system is also called [[approval voting]].  It is said to satisfy Bentham's principle by electing the candidate that makes the greatest number of voters happy.  A criticism of this voting system is that it only tries to make the greatest number of voters happy.  It does not take into account the extent of happiness.  [http://rangevoting.org/vsr.html Social utility efficiency] calculations show that the most utilitarian of the common voting methods, if we consider the degree of happiness rather than an arbitrary binary "happy/unhappy" metric, is [http://RangeVoting.org/ Range Voting].  Some sample social utility efficiency calculations expressed as voter satisfaction ratios (the percentage of the total ideal utility achieved - not the percent of satisfied voters):

Utility measurements: Group A: 5 candidates, 20 voters, random utilities; Each entry averages the results from 4,000,000 simulated elections. Group B: 5 candidates, 50 voters, utilities based on 2 issues, each entry averages the results from 2,222,222 simulated elections.

'''Voting system - VSR A - VSR B'''
<pre>
Magically elect optimum winner 		100.00%		100.00%
Range (honest voters)			96.71%		94.66%
Borda (honest voters)			91.31%		89.97%
Approval (honest voters)		86.30%		83.53%
Condorcet-LR (honest voters)		85.19%		85.43%
Range & Approval (strategic voters)	78.99%		77.01%
IRV (honest voters)			78.49%		76.32%
Plurality (honest voters)		67.63%		62.29%
Borda (strategic exaggerating voters) 	53.26%		51.78%
Condorcet-LR (strategic voters) 	42.56%		41.31%
IRV (strategic exaggerating voters) 	39.07%		39.21%
Plurality (strategic voters)		39.07%		39.21%
Elect random winner			0.00%		0.00%
</pre>