Difference between revisions of "Voting"

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In an incorruptible polling system the "votes" (ballots) are housed in many [[#dissimilar databases]] all of which contain the same data/ballots.
All persons have read only internet access to these databases such that any person can "count the votes". There is no reason to lock the ballots away in a safe where only the "authorities" can see them. and thereThis hasis neveran beenadvantage anyof technology. reason It simply is not possible for everyone to docount so.the votes if the votes only Butexist in paper form. In current systems all the people can't count the votes because they are currently paper and/or they are currently in a machine that only the "auhorities" can access. Assuming paper ballots, these are scanned and an electronic representation is entered into the ballot database(s). Counting the ballots (votes) is a trivial matter and is done by anyone who cares to do so. A lot of people will "roll their own" software to do this and several versions from "trusted" sources will also be available. Perhaps you would trust the local Boy Scouts or the local church, or the Young Republicans or some other organization to provide you with vote counting software. Such software (even in the case of multiple selection balloting) is trivial. There is no reason to believe that browser "plugins" would not be prolific. Assuming for this one moment that it can be certified that the paper ballots and the database ballots are identical then when all persons are satisfied as to their counting (try several different plugins if you want) then the results of the poll are absoultely known by all persons who care to know. There will be no charges of counting fraud or "hanging chads".
 
To make this clear let us assume paper ballots just like we have right now. These are scanned and an electronic representation is entered into the ballot database(s). Counting the ballots (votes) is a trivial matter and is done by anyone who cares to do so. A lot of people will "roll their own" software to do this and several versions from "trusted" sources will also be available. Perhaps you would trust the local Boy Scouts or the local church, or the Young Republicans or some other organization to provide you with vote counting software. Such software (even in the case of multiple selection balloting) is trivial. There is no reason to believe that browser "plugins" would not be prolific. At this point the role of the voting '''authority''' is only to insure that the paper ballots and the database ballots are identical. When all persons are satisfied as to their counting (try several different plugins if you want) then the results of the poll are absoultely known by all persons who care to know. There will be no charges of counting fraud or "hanging chads" or judgements about "voter intent".
 
==Puting Ballots into the Box==
 
Let us again assume paper ballots in our explanation of the proposed voting system. These paper ballots must be '''scanned''' so as to convert the images of the ballots to electronic form. Then the data is transmitted to the database(s). Right away we have some serious problems in that the scanner used for this purpose can be rigged and corrupted. And if the data (the electronic form of the ballots) is actually broadcast over the ariwaves or over the internet and received by the databases (i.e. the database systems are "receivers" always listening and recording the "votes" as scanned and broadcast), then it is possible to introduce counterfeit votes and/or to pick ballots out of the internet stream or out of the air, alter them, and reinsert them in the stream. The iommediate reaction is to "secure" this connection between the scanning system (the scanning authority) and the database system(s). A '''secure''' encrypted connection. This will not be the solution becase it is an authoritative solution.
 
==The Ballots themselves==