3-2-1 voting: Difference between revisions

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In 3-2-1 voting, voters may rate each candidate “Good”, “Acceptable”“OK”, or “Rejected”“Bad”. It has three steps:
 
* Find 3 Semifinalists: the candidates with the most “good” ratings. (If this is a partisan election, no two semifinalists may come from the same party).
* Find 2 Finalists: the semifinalists with the fewest rejections"bad" ratings.
* Find 1 winner: the finalist who is rated above the other on more ballots.
 
There are two extra qualifications for semifinalists: their "good" ratings should be more than anyone else in their party (that is, only one semifinalist per party), and at least 15% of the electorate. Usually all three semifinalists will easily pass these qualifications naturally, but if only 2 of them do, you can just treat them as finalists and skip step 2.
 
== Motivation for each step ==
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It satisfies the [[mutual majority criterion]] as long as any member of the mutual majority set of candidates is among the 3 semifinalists. In practice, this is almost guaranteed to be the case.
 
Steps 1 and 3 satisfy the [[later no-harm criterion]]. Thus, the only strategic reason not to add any "acceptableOK" ratings would be if your favorite was one of the two most-rejected semifinalists but also was able to beat the least-rejected semifinalist in step 3. This combination of weak and strong is unlikely to happen in real life, and even less likely to be predictable enough a priori to be a basis for strategy.
 
This system fails the [[favorite betrayal criterion]], in that in steps 1 or 2 it could in theory be necessary to rate your favorite below "Good" in order to leave room for a more-viable compromise candidate to be a semifinalist or finalist. However, in order for that to be a worthwhile strategy, the compromise would have to do better in a pairwise race against the other finalist, but have a worse chance of becoming a semifinalist or finalist under your honest vote. This combination of strength in one context and weakness in another is akin to a Condorcet cycle, and like such cycles, it may be rare in real-world elections, and even rarer that it is predictable enough a priori to make a favorite-betrayal strategy feasible.
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! Candidate
! "Good" ratings
! "AcceptableOK" ratings
! "Bad" ratings
! 2-way score
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! Faction size
! "Good" candidates
! "AcceptableOK" candidates
! "Bad" candidates
|-
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! Candidate
! "Good" ratings
! "AcceptableOK" ratings
! "Bad" ratings
! 2-way score
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