Favorite betrayal criterion: Difference between revisions
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and B is the [[Condorcet winner]]. See also the [[chicken dilemma]].
[[Condorcet methods]] can have their FB incentive eliminated in certain scenarios. For example:
26 A>B
25 B
49 C
A beats B beats C beats A. To prevent A-top voters from voting B>A to make B the CW, it can essentially be observed that they have the incentive to do so, and if they do this, nobody else has incentive to vote differently, so B would automatically win. However, if the 49 C voters instead had voted C>A, then they make it so that now the voting method recognizes the C-top voters have an incentive to do FB to elect A rather than B. So a cycle would be formed all over again. This means that this trick doesn't always work. See [[Algorithmic Asset Voting]].
C>A
== Further reading ==
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