Favorite betrayal criterion: Difference between revisions
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#Bad Party
#Ideal Party
== Stronger forms of the criterion ==
FBC simply requires that for a given election, a voter always has some kind of [[strategy]] they can use to vote in such a way that they most support their favorite candidate. However, this means that some voting methods that fail FB can allow a voter to benefit by doing FB, even though they didn't actually have to. For example, several voting methods which pass FBC because they allow a voter to protect themselves by equally ranking multiple candidates 1st (implying that the voter has a simple way to always avoid FB i.e. equal-ranking, as opposed to some FBC-compliant voting methods where the non-FB strategy may be opaque or difficult to figure out and thus less useful for avoiding FB) are like this. [[Score voting]] passes a stronger form of FBC, which says that voters can never benefit by doing FB i.e. there is no possible strategy involving FB that can benefit a voter.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/FBCexecSumm.html|title=RangeVoting.org - Favorite betrayal (executive summary)|last=|first=|date=|website=rangevoting.org|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-05-14|quote=We've come a long way since the days when range and approval voting were the only known methods in which betraying your favorite is strategically avoidable. Now many other methods also are known with that "FBC property." [...]
However, it appears Range and Approval satisfy FBC in a stronger and more obvious sense than these other methods. Specifically, with Range and Approval, betraying your favorite simply never is useful. With the other methods it can be strategically useful (cause X to win instead of Y, where the betrayers prefer X) but if so there is always a way to get the same effect (i.e. make X win) by some other dishonest vote not involving favorite betrayal.}}</ref>
== Notes ==
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