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Improved Condorcet Approval: Difference between revisions
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When no voter uses equal ranking in the first position, ICA is equivalent to ordinary [[Condorcet//Approval]].
==Variants==
===Variant: Defeat strength minimum===
It is possible to disregard defeats below a certain strength without harming the method's properties. This could be done if it were thought undesirable to find that the set ''S'' is empty, when one candidate would have made it into the set except for one very weak defeat.
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When ''q'' is set to 50%, then the method is equivalent to [[Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval]], and all values of t[a,b] (for any candidates ''a'' and ''b'') can be assumed to be zero without affecting the result.
===Variant: "Tied and approved" rather than "Tied at the top"===
The above definition defines t[a,b] to be the number of voters tying ''a'' and ''b'' in the top position. This is the most conservative change from [[Condorcet//Approval]], since it's only in this case that we can be sure the voter would like to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the winner is either ''a'' or ''b''.
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