Instant-runoff voting: Difference between revisions
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In normal [[runoff voting]], D and E are the two candidates with the most votes, preventing the majority's preferred candidates from entering the runoff. In FPTP, D has the most votes. But with IRV, first C is eliminated, and then E, and then B, resulting in A having 51 votes and winning. Note that though the 49 voter-minority preferred B to A, B didn't win; this is an example of IRV ignoring voter preferences in a way that can lead to some majorities (when looking at [[Head-to-head matchup|head-to-head matchups]]) having less power. However, the majority still got a better result than it would've had in some other methods.
IRV is equivalent to [[runoff voting]] (supposing no change in preferences) when there are 3 or fewer candidates. This is used to argue both for and against it; advocates claim it is cheaper and easier for the voters to vote once, while opponents argue that a delayed runoff actually gives voters a second look into the candidates in the runoff, potentially improving the quality of their decision-making, and that because ranking candidates is harder than picking one candidate, that runoff voting is actually easier for voters. Note that though IRV is called instant runoff, this is more because it elects a candidate who could win or tie a runoff ([[pairwise beat]] or tie) against at least one other candidate, rather than because it is equivalent to runoff voting in all cases.
One simple way to modify IRV to address many of the issues IRV opponents have without changing IRV fundamentally is to allow voters to approve candidates (using an [[approval threshold]]). If there are any majority-approved candidates, elect the most-approved of them, otherwise run IRV. Even if voters [[Favorite Betrayal|Favorite Betray]], they can still approve their honest favorite, giving that candidate a chance to still win. In addition, this allows voters to better avert the [[center squeeze effect]]. The standard argument made by IRV advocates against [[Approval voting]], that it fails [[later-no-harm]], has little to no relevance to this modification, since voters seeking to avoid hurting their favorite candidates' chances of winning in the approval round can simply refrain from approving anyone, forcing the election to run under IRV rules.
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