Iterated Bucklin: Difference between revisions
m
no edit summary
m (Added reference to Kevin Venzke's calculator.) |
mNo edit summary Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit Visual edit |
||
| (2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
Line 1:
Iterated Bucklin (alternatively Bucklin-IRV, or BIRV) is a ranked [[Approval voting|Approval]] count, a variant of [[Bucklin voting]] whereby the number of top preferences an individual ballot reveals at any point is a function of the rank in which the ballot places the winner of the count so far. This modifies the standard [[Bucklin voting]] procedure by which all ballots reveal the same, progressively increasing number of top preferences until a quota of support is filled by at least one candidate.
Iterated Bucklin was [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002649.html proposed] by Etjon Basha in December 2020 as an attempt to produce a count that exhibits few practical violations of voting criteria (elicits the greatest degree of sincerity for voters) and the least degree of count complexity, at the cost of not formally meeting many criteria. Iterated Bucklin [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002649.html violates] [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]], [[Later no-harm criterion|Later-No-Harm]], [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002650.html Later-No-Help] and is not precinct summable. A preliminary simulation of the count’s propensity to violate various criteria was conducted by Kevin Venzke.<ref>[http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002650.html "Strategic Bucklin variant?"] - ''Kevin Venzke'' - Dec 16 22:57:59 PST 2020</ref>
Line 52:
== Potential for Hand Count ==
It may be feasible to hand-count an election conducted by Iterated Bucklin, especially if precincts are few or reduced to one. Limiting the number of allowable preferences to a given number (ex. no more than
Hand counts could also be facilitated by having all candidates publish their rankings of approved candidates (of any), and allowing the votes for each candidate to link to these published lists, in turn a system somewhat similar to [[Asset Voting]].
In practice, even simple elections in Iterated Bucklin may require a relatively large number of rounds until final resolution is achieved (see example) and the count may be especially susceptible to small errors at any point of the count which could produce a completely altered succession of Placeholder Winners and, thus, ultimate winner. ▼
▲
== Example ==
| |||