PAMSAC: Difference between revisions
Added equivalence to var-Phragmén + CFAT
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(Added equivalence to var-Phragmén + CFAT) |
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</blockquote>Taking away half the approvals in this way is more detrimental to the CD result than the AB result, since under the CD result, voters were each only represented by one candidate to start with, so under the transformed result, half the voters are effectively left unrepresented. Under the AB result, since voters were already each represented by two candidates, removing half of the approvals still leaves three quarters of the voters with some representation. Applying Ebert's Method to the transformed ballots results in the election of A and B.
Ebert's Method can still fail monotonicity with CFAT applied, so when a potential winning set of candidates is considered in PAMSAC, the measure of a set of candidates is the minimum achievable sum of squared voter loads after detrimental approvals have been removed. The approvals are removed before CFAT is applied. The removal of detrimental approvals is actually equivalent to allowing the load from a candidate to be unequally spread across their voters. As such PAMSAC is the same as [[Phragmen's voting rules | var-Phragmén]] with CFAT.
== Further reading ==
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