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Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions
→Favorite betrayal?
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# There are no honest Condorcet cycles.
If the above restrictions hold, then PAR voting would meet FBC. It is arguably likely that real-world voting scenarios will meet the above restrictions, except for a negligible fraction of "ideologically atypical" voters. For instance, in the first scenario above, the categories appear to be {XA}, {B}, and {C}, so the B>AC voters would probably actually vote either B>A or B>C.
Third, note that in any scenario where it fails that for some small group, there is a rational strategy for some superset of that group which does not involve betrayal. For instance, in first scenario above, if 11 of the AX>B voters switch to >AXB, then A is eliminated without any betrayal.
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