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Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions
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There are a few criteria for which it does not pass as such, but where it passes related but weaker criteria. These include:
* It fails [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]], but passes [[Local independence of irrelevant alternatives]].
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It fails the [[consistency criterion]], the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], [[reversibility]], the [[majority loser criterion]], the [[Strategy-free criterion]], and the [[later-no-harm criterion|later-no-harm]] and [[later-no-help criterion|later-no-help]] criteria.
=== Favorite betrayal? ===
PAR voting fails the [[favorite betrayal criterion]] (FBC). For instance, consider the following "non-disqualifying center-squeeze" scenario:
* 35: AX>B
* 10: B>A
* 10: B>AC
* 5: B>C
* 40: C>B
None are eliminated, so C wins with 40 points (against 35, 25, 35 for A, B, and X). However, if 6 of the first group of voters strategically betrayed their true favorite A, the situation would be as follows:
* 29: AX>B
* 6: X>B
* 10: B>A
* 10: B>AC
* 5: B>C
* 40: C>B
Now, A is eliminated with 51% rejection; so B (the CW) wins.
However, there are several ways to "rescue" FBC-like behavior for this system.
First, add a "compromise" option to the ballot, as described in [[FBPPAR]].
Third, note that in any scenario where it fails that for some small group, there is a rational strategy for some superset of that group which does not involve betrayal. For instance, in first scenario above, if 11 of the AX>B voters switch to >AXB, then A is eliminated without any betrayal.
== An example ==
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