Relevant rating: Difference between revisions
Simplified secondary method
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(Simplified secondary method) |
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In Relevant rating, when comparing the total number of ballots approving a candidate X at and above a rating R to a contrasting number, instead of using the ''total number of ballots'' rating X below R as that contrasting number (as in MJ), we use the maximum approval for ''any candidate'' on those complementary ballots. As in [[IBIFA]], this is what renders the method independent of irrelevant ballots, because ballots that don't change the complementary approval winner won't change the relevant rating.
Using a similar and much simpler process, we could also find the Relevant Rating winner without having to create a full Relevant Ratings ranking of candidates.
# Initialize the rating level R to MAXRATING
# Initialize candidate totals, '''T(X)''', to zero
# Initialize '''TCA(X,C)''' to the highest approval for any candidate on ballots that rate X below R
# Repeat until a winner is found:
# If all approval ratings above zero have been exhausted, the candidate with the highest total approval is the winner.▼
## For each candidate X, add ballots rating X at level R to T(X)
## Is '''T(X) > TCA(X,C)'''? If so X is a member of the current qualifying set
▲## If
## Otherwise, decrement R by one
## Set TCA(X,C) to the highest approval for any candidate on ballots that rate X below the new R
## For each candidate X, is '''T(X) > TCA(X,C)''' (using new TCA(X,C))? If so, then X is a member of a new qualifying set.
## If the new qualifying set has at least one member Q', then the candidate with the highest T(Q') is the winner.
Note that after R is decremented to zero, the new TCA(X,C) will be zero. So the final step after R is zero will always find an approval winner.
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
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