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SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval): Difference between revisions
SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval) (view source)
Revision as of 16:27, 28 June 2011
, 13 years ago→Advantages
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# Assuming that all voters who choose to delegate their vote agree with the declared preference order of their candidate, and assuming that approval ballots are enough to express the relevant preferences of all voters who do not cast a delegable ballot, then any pairwise champion (Condorcet winner) will be a known, strong equilibrium winner. That means that, if all candidates delegate their votes rationally, no coalition of candidates can elect anybody they all prefer to the natural winner, the candidate who could beat all others one-on-one. (This is simply due to the well-known result that a CW is a [[Strong Nash equilibrium]] winner under Approval.)
# Leaders of minority factions would have an appropriate voice for their concerns, although power would ultimately reside with any majority coalition which exists.
# This should be generally acceptable to current politicians, who are winners in a Plurality two-party system. Plurality-style voting still works just fine, and if most votes are for major parties, this system will cleanly allow a major party to win, in many cases without going to the delegation round (especially if the major-party candidates do not pre-announce delegation preferences, thus preventing an extorting minor party from demanding their delegated votes).
(Note: if major-party candidates oppose SODA because it might force them to negotiate somewhat for minor-party delegated votes, a SODA supporter could respond "He just wants the only smoke-filled room to be the one inside his skull.")
== Criticism and responses ==
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