SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval): Difference between revisions

Line 18:
Optional rule 4.5 (between 4 and 5): If any candidate has less than 5% (of the total votes) as delegable votes, and is not one of the top two in total votes, then those votes are automatically delegated to the first candidate on their approval list who has more than 5% delegable votes or more than 20% total votes. They will be further delegated to the largest sequence from their original candidate's preference order which is contained in their receiving candidate's delegations. So if they originally went to A who preferred alphabetically, then and they're passed to D who delegates to BCEGH, they'll end up approving ABCDE. This rule prevents giving excessive kingmaker power to a tiny faction. Note that all delegation is still non-exclusive, approval-style.
 
This isrule notwould justhelp amake sopthis tosystem themore attractive to major-party parties,politicians. thoughBut it's woulda helpprincipled makerule, thisnot systemjust morea attractivesop to partisanthe politiciansmajor parties. Consider the "kingmaker" case: in a basically 50/50 split, some tiny party has the balance of votes, and manages to extract concessions far bigger than their base of support justifies, just in order to [not] delegate those votes. I think that's unjust, and this rule would prevent it. So I'd recommend this rule whenever people will tolerate the complexity.
 
I think that 5% is a good cutoff here; that's tens of millions of voters, and enough to deserve a voice. It shouldn't be too high, because this rule is effectively taking power away from voters; that's only justified if the faction is so small that the power is not legitimate, and so it's better to err a bit on the small side if anything. But under 5% - that is, under 10% of the winning coalition - doesn't deserve kingmaker power.
Anonymous user