Difference between revisions of "Score voting"

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Score's satisfaction of the above-mentioned property (max of 1 vote of differentiation in a beatpath) is one of the reasons it nominally passes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives where Condorcet methods don't, as the only time those methods fail it is when no [[Beats-all winner|beats-all winner]] exists, and forcing Condorcet methods to satisfy that property ensures a beats-or-ties-all winner will exist.
 
When the Score winner is the Condorcet winner, and all voters expressed all of their ranked preferences with the scores, then this means that each voter could exaggerate their preference in each head-to-head matchup from the weak pairwise preference they expressed in Score to a maximal pairwise preference and obtain the same result if the head-to-head matchups are used to find the Condorcet winner in both circumstances. The same holds for when the Score ranking is equivalent to the [[Condorcet ranking]].
 
== Notes ==
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