Difference between revisions of "Score voting"

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→‎Notes: Attempt to remove bias by pointing out how absurd the behaviour described would be
(→‎Notes: Attempt to remove bias by pointing out how absurd the behaviour described would be)
Score voting can be simulated with Approval ballots if every voter votes probabilistically according to their utility value for each candidate i.e. a voter who thinks a candidate is a 6 out of 10 would use a dice or other randomizing device to approve that candidate with only 60% probability. With this approach, the Approval voting winner will probabilistically be the Score voting winner so long as there are many voters. In some sense, cardinal utility is tied to randomness in that it is often considered a better measure than ordinal utility when analyzing decision-making under uncertainty.
 
Score is probably the only major deterministic voting method which can fail the majority criterion in the two-candidate case. OftentimesIt is, votinghowever, reformpractically proposalsimpossible forto governmentalhappen electionsin implementpractice ansince alternativethe votingscale methodfor whenscore 3+voting candidatesis run,set butby allowthe orcandidates mandatewho usingrun. [[FPTP]] whenWith only two candidates run,each ostensibly for simplicity and because itvoter will electvote theone pairwisecandidate winnerat anyways;each thisextreme isof notthe asscale goodresulting anin ideaa ifreduction Scoreto isapproval the reform proposalvoting. Indeed,It someis whothen preferalso Scorevery argueunlikely that FPTPany isvoter finewould forapprove two-candidateof elections,both butor thisneither cancandidate leadwhen tovoting. an illogicalityOftentimes, whichvoting isreform failingproposals [[Independencefor ofgovernmental irrelevantelections alternatives]]:implement whenan therealternative isvoting a [[Condorcet cycle]] involving the Score winnermethod when 3+ candidates are runningrun, thenbut ifallow allor candidatesmandate exceptusing the[[FPTP]] Scorewhen winneronly andtwo thecandidates candidaterun, theyostensibly pairwisefor losesimplicity toand dropbecause out of the election, then the use of FPTPit will lead toelect the Scorepairwise winner now losing even if every voter was honest and had the same preferencesanyways. ThisSome canwho beprefer avertedScore byargue the voters if they use a probabilistic strategy to decide how to vote in thethat FPTP electionis however,fine since they can simulate their margin of strength of preference between thefor two candidates by choosing to either vote for their preferred -candidate betweenelections thesince twoscore orwill notreduce vote.to See the [[Utility]] pageFPTP for anrational examplevoters.
 
Despite this, if enough voters vote in a way contrary both to how the system is intended and their honest interest there can be results similar to failing [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]]. When there is a [[Condorcet cycle]] involving the Score winner when 3+ candidates are running, then if all candidates except the Score winner and the candidate they pairwise lose to drop out of the election, then the use of FPTP will lead to the Score winner now losing even if every voter was honest and had the same preferences. Such a situation is virtually impossible since if a winner drops out after an election another will be held. This can be averted by the voters if they use a probabilistic strategy to decide how to vote in the FPTP election however, since they can simulate their margin of strength of preference between the two candidates by choosing to either vote for their preferred candidate between the two or not vote. See the [[Utility]] page for an example.
 
== References ==
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