Difference between revisions of "Majority score voting"

Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Homunq
 
(6 intermediate revisions by one other user not shown)
#* ''This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.''
 
== Naming noteand relationship to other systems ==
 
Majority score voting was originally called SARA voting, an acronym for the 4 ratings voters can give. However, putting these ratings out-of-order is confusing, even if it results in a nice-sounding acronym.
 
It's also similar to other systems such as [[MAS]], [[Majority Choice Approval]], and other [[graded Bucklin]] systems. Like such systems, it first checks a candidate's median, and, if that is good enough to be comparable with other candidates, goes on to break that "tie" using some other voting method.
 
== Criteria compliance ==
 
* It fails the [[participation criterion]] but passes the [[semi-honest participation criterion]].
 
* It fails the [[Strategy-free criterion]], but, as shown in the center squeeze scenario below, in a 3-candidate scenario it does at least offer viable strategies to each of the subgroups of the majority that prefers X>Y, such that either of the potentially-strategic subgroups has a strategy to ensure Y loses, even if the other potentially-strategic subgroup does not maximally cooperate. ("Subgroup" in this sense is characterized by whether they prefer Z over or under both. The assumption is that the "honest" vote is Support, Accept, Reject in some order for the three candidates, or only Support and Reject in case of indifference between two of them. This guarantees that any X>Z>Y voters will maximally cooperate under honesty, so this subgroup is not potentially-strategic.)
 
It fails the [[consistency criterion]], the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], [[reversibility]], the [[majority loser criterion]], and the [[later-no-harm criterion]].
As discussed in the above section, if all the candidates in the first round got a majority "reject", then the voters have sent a message that none of the candidates are good, akin to a result of "[[none of the above]]" (NOTA). Majority score still gives a winner, but it might be good to have a rule to limit the chance that such a winner would remain in office for multiple terms. This could either be a hard term limit, so that such a winner could only legally serve one term; or perhaps a softer rule that if they run for the same office again, the information of what percent of voters had rejected them should be next to their name on the ballot.
 
[[Category:Graded Bucklin systemsmethods]]
Cookies help us deliver our services. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies.

Navigation menu