Difference between revisions of "Score voting"

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Score can be thought of as a [[Condorcet method]] where a voter may only put up to 1 vote (i.e. the maximum number of points allowed) in between any pair of candidates in a [[beatpath]]. That is, a strategic voter whose preference is A>B>C can maximally contribute to A getting more points than B or to B getting more points than C, but not both. A rated ballot A:5 B:4 C:0 with max score of 5 is treated as "A is 1 point better than B, B is 4 points better than C, and A is 5 points better than C", whereas in Condorcet all three [[Pairwise counting|pairwise comparisons]] are treated as "more-preferred candidate is 1 vote i.e. 5 points better than less-preferred candidates." Both Score and Condorcet elect the candidate who can get more points/votes than any other opponent in one-on-one comparisons, though in Condorcet such a candidate may [[Condorcet paradox|not always]] exist.
 
Score's satisfaction of the above-mentioned property (max of 1 vote of differentiation in a beatpath) is one of the reasons it nominally passes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives where Condorcet methods don't, as the only time those methods fail itiesit is when no [[Beats-all winner|beats-awlall dinnerwinner]] exists, and forcing Condorcet methods to satisfy that property ensures a beats-or-ties-all winner will exist.
 
== References ==
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