Difference between revisions of "Proportionality for Solid Coalitions"
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Looking at the top 5 lines, 50 voters, a Hare quota, mutually most prefer the set of candidates (A1-5) over all other candidates, so Hare-PSC requires at least one of (A1-5) must win. (Note that Sequential Monroe voting fails Hare-PSC in this example. However, one could forcibly make SMV do so by declaring that the candidate with the highest Monroe score within the set (A1-5) must win the first seat, for example.) <ref>https://forum.electionscience.org/t/an-example-of-maximal-divergence-between-smv-and-hare-psc/586</ref>
Generally, Droop-PSC makes it more likely that a majority will win at least half the seats than only Hare-PSC. The reason for this is that majority solid coalitions always constitute enough
<blockquote>So, the Hare quota here is 20. A1 and A2 are immediately elected, but post-transfer A3 only has 11 votes, and is thus eliminated first. B1, B2, B3 take the remaining 3 seats.<ref>https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/ermb1s/comment/ff7a7f8</ref></blockquote>
There can be quota overlaps when assigning PSC claims; suppose a group constituting 80% of a quota of voters vote A>B>C
== Generalised solid coalitions ==