Difference between revisions of "Score voting"

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In general, the optimal strategy for range voting is to vote it identically to approval voting, so that all candidates are given either the maximum score or the minimum score. For more detailed strategies, see [[approval voting]].
 
In both Approval and Score, the best strategy will always involve giving maximal support to your 1st choice(s) and no support to your least favorite(s) (how you score the other candidates will depend more on the situation). This is because this maximizes the chances the candidates you prefer most win and minimizes the chances the candidates you want least win. Because of this, Score and Approval always pass the [[Majority criterion|majority criterion]] in the two-candidate case, and the [[Mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]] (indeed, even the [[Smith criterion]] and [[Condorcet criterion]]) when voters' preferences are dichotomous (i.e. they view all candidates as either good or bad, implying they are all either one of the voter's 1st choices or one of their last choices) for any number of candidates, if all voters are strategic.
 
Range voting has an advantage over approval voting if
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