User:BetterVotingAdvocacy/Big page of ideas: Difference between revisions

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The justification for the second type of transitivity (which is based on Score voting) can be seen colloquially: if the voter indicates they "somewhat" prefer A to B, and "strongly" prefer B to C, then it'd seem that they ought to "very strongly" prefer A to C.
 
If using Score-based transitivity, there are two situations where constraints must be applied, supposing the voter's preference is A>B>C: if the voter votes A>B 30% and A>C 35%, then they can at most vote B>C 5%. This is because A>B + B>C ought to provide the minimum margin for A>C. And if the voter votes A>B 40% and B>C 20%, then they must give A>C at least 60% support. Also note that with Score transitivity, there is an implication the voter's marginal strength of preference for a candidate must increase as they are pitted in matchups against other candidates, the less and less preferred they are i.e. a voter's marginal support for 1st choice>3rd choice must be greater than 1st>2nd. This is because in order to indicate a 2nd>3rd preference, the voter has to put some kind of margin there, which then factors into the minimum margin required for 1st>3rd. To some extent, this makes this type of transitivity easier to work with than the other type of transitivity, because there will be more matchups where the voter is required to give 100% support, which means less matchups where the ratings can change the result. For a scale of 0 to 5, for example, the voter is guaranteed to give 1st>5th6th 100% support, as well as to 1st>6th7th, etc. In general, if there are n possible scores (evenly spaced apart, and including the min score), then a candidate in the j-th rank will have 100% support against someone at the (j+n-1)-th slot and below.
 
The use of the rated pairwise ballot may increase the likelihood of a transitive result (i.e. having a Condorcet winner) relative to the use of a ranked ballot in Condorcet methods.