0-info Later-No-Help: Difference between revisions
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== Definition of ZLNHe
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== Definition of Strong ZLNHe
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Things are different when we're talking about probabilities in a 0-info election.
When, in that 0-info election, the probability of electing an unacceptable isn't reduced by ranking
I name Strong ZLNHe in terms of LNHe because the relevant thing about it is the absence of need to rank unacceptable candidates. Strong ZLNHe simply achieves what ZLNHe achieves, but more so.
If there were a little not-so-reliable information about the relative winnabilities of unacceptables X and Y, then there could begin to be some incentive to rank one over the other. Compliance with Strong ZLNHe instead of just ZLNHe would more strongly outweigh that incentive to rank
So, instead of a failure of a 0-info probabilistic Later-No-Harm, a compliance with Strong ZLNHe is more relevantly regarded as a compliance with a stronger and more reassuring 0-info probabilistic Later-No-Help.
== Complyng methods
Of course all methods that meet LNHe also meet ZLNHe.
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== Definition of Later-No-Help (LNHe)
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== Commentary
LNHe is relevant to bottom-end strategy. For example, many rank methods that fail LNHe have bottom-end strategy that calls for ranking unacceptable candidates in reverse order of winnability. A method that meets LNHe doesn't have such a strategy-need. LNHe-complying methods don't need bottom-end strategy.
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== A Few Compliance Demonstratons
(This will make more sense after reading the definition of [[Symmetrical ICT]] (SITC) )
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Whichever one could be made to beat the other, your bottom-voting of X
and Y counts toward that pairwise beaten-ness. In the event that
SICT's beat-condition rule says that both X and Y beat
SICT says that the one that beats the other is the one ranked over the
other on more ballots than vice-versa.
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number of X>Y ballots be greater than the number of Y>X ballots you're
voting for X being the one that beats the other, in the event of both
beating
So, if you knew that, then it would be better to rank X and not Y. But
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