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3-2-1 voting: Difference between revisions
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=== Delegated 3-2-1 ===
In this
When a voter leaves a candidate X blank/unrated, X receives the lowest rating that they got from any candidate that voter rated "Good". So if the voter had rated candidates A and B "good", and both A and B rated X as "OK", then X would get an "OK" from that voter; while if either A and/or B had rated X as "Bad", then X would get a "Bad" from that voter.
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== Properties ==
This
It satisfies the [[mutual majority criterion]] as long as any member of the mutual majority set of candidates is among the 3 semifinalists. In practice, this is almost guaranteed to be the case.
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Steps 1 and 3 satisfy the [[later no-harm criterion]]. Thus, the only strategic reason not to add any "OK" ratings would be if your favorite was one of the two most-rejected semifinalists but also was able to beat the least-rejected semifinalist in step 3. This combination of weak and strong is unlikely to happen in real life, and even less likely to be predictable enough a priori to be a basis for strategy.
This
In terms of summability, this can be done in one of two ways. They
== Examples ==
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The semifinalists are Lions, Tigers, and Bulldogs. The finalists are Lions and Tigers. The winner is Tigers.
This shows a "chicken dilemma" between the felines (Lions and Tigers); together, they can beat Bulldogs, but separately they can't. In 3-2-1, as in almost any voting
== For US presidential elections ==
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# If they constitute a majority of the electoral college, signatory states are bound by compact to give all their electors to the national winner.
In order for a voting
Step 2: "raw totals in some format": many voting methods exist, and many of them require different information from the ballots for summability. One reasonable lowest common denominator would be that all states must publish the rating or ranking levels available, and the raw tallies — the number of times each candidate is rated or ranked at each level. This is far less information than would be required to find a winner under IRV or Condorcet, but it is enough for 3-2-1, when combined with the following steps. It is also information that naturally would always be available from states using simpler
Step 4: In order to add to provide national totals, each state's final totals should be in the form of a point
Step 3: So a state using 3-2-1 must be able to look at the raw tallies from other states, and provide final local tallies, such that the following properties are satisfied:
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It's easy to give tallies that satisfy the properties above. First, you find the semifinalists — the 3 candidates with the most top-ratings nationwide — and the finalists — the two semifinalists with the fewest bottom-ratings nationwide. Then, tally 1 point each time a candidate is rated "good"; 0 points each time they're rated "bad"; and for "OK" ratings tally 1 point if that ballot didn't rate either of the finalists "good", and 0 points otherwise.
This procedure works fine in combination with other states using approval voting, plurality voting, or various other
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]]
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