Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
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[[Asset Voting]] can, depending on which relevant assumptions are made about how negotiators act, be turned into a [[Generalized Condorcet criterion|Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] in the single-winner case, and a Condorcet PR method in the multiwinner case (akin to [[CPO-STV]] and [[Schulze STV]]). Its variants, [[Sequential Asset Voting]] and Bloc Asset Voting, can also be algorithmized.
=== Assumptions ===
Some of the assumptions are:
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When doing a matchup, transfer votes in such a way as to ensure a voter gets as many of their favorite candidates as possible. (If the voter submitted a rated ballot, optionally attempt to instead maximize their overall utility i.e. if electing their 1st choice is worth 9 utility points, and electing their 2nd and 3rd choice is 8+5= 13, prioritize electing the latter two).
Use a [[Smith criterion|Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] to elect from the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] of outcomes (or use any Condorcet cycle resolution method).
=== Example ===
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21 SD
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(A, C, D) vs. (A, C, S):
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26.5 D
21 S
Here, 7.5 CBD votes and the 19 other votes that prefer D to S give their votes to D. A, C, and D are then the 3 candidates with the most votes, and since the voters who prefer S>D don't have enough votes to change the outcome, (A, C, D) win this matchup. Since we already know (A, C, D) can win all other matchups, (A, C, D) is the Condorcet winner and wins.
== Explanation of how Asset Voting is, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet method (and how this enables it to be done as an algorithm) ==
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