Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
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When doing a matchup, transfer votes in such a way as to ensure a voter gets as many of their favorite candidates as possible. (If the voter submitted a rated ballot, optionally attempt to instead maximize their overall utility i.e. if electing their 1st choice is worth 9 utility points, and electing their 2nd and 3rd choice is 8+5= 13, prioritize electing the latter two).
If there isn't a stable winner in a pairwise matchup (the negotiators are never able to make one outcome beat the other without some negotiators making strategically rational moves that help the other outcome win), declare the matchup a tie.
Use a [[Smith criterion|Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet method]] to elect from the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] of outcomes (or use any Condorcet cycle resolution method).
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26 A
34
6
8
5
21
It can immediately be observed that A and C have over a quota of 1st choices, so they will win. (D, S) form a Droop solid coalition of 26 votes, so one of them must win. Therefore, the only outcomes to compare are (A, C, D), (and (A, C, S).
(A, C, D) vs. (A, C, S):
26 A
26.5 C
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