Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
ref formatting
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (formatting) |
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (ref formatting) |
||
Line 47:
== Explanation of how Asset Voting is, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet method (and how this enables it to be done as an algorithm) ==
In the single-winner case, if the negotiators are honest, strictly follow voter preferences, and have enough time to negotiate, then Asset becomes a Smith-efficient [[Condorcet method]], and in the multiwinner case, resembles Condorcet PR methods such as [[CPO-STV]] and [[Schulze STV]] (these transformations can be observed by turning Asset Voting into an algorithm using various assumptions, as mentioned below). The reasoning for this can in part be linked to the fact that Asset is an iterative voting method (it is almost like an iterative version of FPTP; iterative voting methods are generally more Condorcet efficient than their non-iterative equivalents<ref>
Asset Voting can be done algorithmically on ranked or rated ballots when certain assumptions are applied, such as the ones mentioned above (here is a [https://www.removeddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/eac87u/demonstrating_condorcet_pairwise_counting_with_an/ visualization] of the algorithm). One main assumption is that every negotiator attempts to maximize their assigned voters' satisfaction with the outcome.
|