Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
→Example
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Here, 7.5 CBD votes and the 19 other votes that prefer D to S give their votes to D. A, C, and D are then the 3 candidates with the most votes, and since the voters who prefer S>D don't have enough votes to change the outcome, (A, C, D) win this matchup. Since we already know (A, C, D) can win all other matchups, (A, C, D) is the Condorcet winner and wins.
Another example:
If there are 51 voters who prefer Party A and 49 for Party B, then in a 5-winner election, the 49 B voters can always ensure two of their candidates are in the final winner set.
== Explanation of how Asset Voting is, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet method (and how this enables it to be done as an algorithm) ==
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The use of the [[KP transform]] on rated ballots and then converting those Approval ballots to ranked ballots allows voters to submit, for example, a rated ballot A5 B4 C3, and have it treated either as 0.2 votes A>B, 0.2 votes B>C, and 0.4 votes A>C (score for preferred candidate minus score for less preferred candidate divided by max score yields the number of votes in each matchup) or 1 vote A>B, 1 vote B>C, 1 vote A>C.
Note that in a pairwise match-up between two winner sets, a third winner set can actually emerge as the winner. This is because some voters may prefer some candidates from one set and some from the other. For example, in a matchup between a set with only the majority's preferred candidates and another set with mostly candidates with almost no support, but one candidate whom a quota prefer, the final winner will actually be a new winner set where most of the candidates are the majority's preferred candidates and the final candidate is the quota's preferred candidate.
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