Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
→Explanation of how Asset Voting is, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet method (and how this enables it to be done as an algorithm)
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== Explanation of how Asset Voting is, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet method (and how this enables it to be done as an algorithm) ==
[[File:Asset Condorcet Winner example modified.png|thumb|400x400px|Algorithmic Asset to elect a Condorcet winner. ]]
[[File:Asset Smith Set example.png|thumb|425x425px|Algorithmic Asset identifying the Smith Set. ]]
In the single-winner case, if the negotiators are honest, strictly follow voter preferences, and have enough time to negotiate, then Asset becomes a Smith-efficient [[Condorcet method]], and in the multiwinner case, resembles Condorcet PR methods such as [[CPO-STV]] and [[Schulze STV]] (these transformations can be observed by turning Asset Voting into an algorithm using various assumptions, as mentioned below). The reasoning for this can in part be linked to the fact that Asset is an iterative voting method (it is almost like an iterative version of FPTP; iterative voting methods are generally more Condorcet efficient than their non-iterative equivalents<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Grandi|first=Umberto|last2=Loreggia|first2=Andrea|last3=Rossi|first3=Francesca|last4=Venable|first4=Kristen Brent|last5=Walsh|first5=Toby|date=2013|editor-last=Perny|editor-first=Patrice|editor2-last=Pirlot|editor2-first=Marc|editor3-last=Tsoukiàs|editor3-first=Alexis|title=Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score|url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14|journal=Algorithmic Decision Theory|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science|language=en|publisher=Springer Berlin Heidelberg|pages=181–192|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14|isbn=978-3-642-41575-3}}</ref>) where the voters/negotiators are constantly updated on who is about to win if no change in votes occur (i.e. which set of candidates of a size equal to the number of seats to be filled have more votes committed to them than all other candidates so far), and they can, therefore, plan to defeat such candidates. Pairwise comparison is implicitly involved in this planning, as the negotiators must see if the candidates they prefer over those about to win can obtain more votes from all negotiators than those who are about to win.
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