Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
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Some optional assumptions are:
* When a negotiator is indifferent between certain outcomes (i.e. because their voters equally ranked those outcomes), they use their assets to help pick the socially best of those outcomes. As an example, if the voters cast rated ballots <blockquote>49 A5 B4 3 A5 B5 48 B5</blockquote>then treat the 3 A=B votes as preferring B, because B has the most points, giving B 51 > A 49 votes, making B the winner even though more voters actually prefer A.
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*hen use the 3 A=B votes to go in B's favor.
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* In the multiwinner case, when a voter submits a rated ballot, and their negotiator can choose between electing, say, the voter's first choice, or both of their second and third choices, the negotiator somehow uses the rated information to decide which outcome is preferable (i.e. they might add up the utilities for the voter in either outcome and pursue the higher-utility outcome.)
* A resolution method is applied when there are multiple outcomes in the Smith Set, and the candidates' preferences can change in order to change the Smith Set in favor of maximizing their voters' satisfaction (though this might break the algorithm or make it fail to be Condorcet-efficient in certain scenarios). As a further possibility, the candidates might also be allowed to try to induce Condorcet cycles or otherwise grow the Smith Set in ways that allow them to then resolve the election in favor of their voters' satisfaction (though this also might break the algorithm).
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