Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
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== Resisting Favorite Betrayal and burying ==
In some cases, it's possible to use the concept of AAV to reduce Favorite Betrayal incentive. For example:
▲In some cases, it's possible to use the concept of AAV to reduce Favorite Betrayal incentive. For example: <blockquote>48 A>B
5 B
47 C </blockquote>There's a Condorcet cycle here between all 3 candidates. But note that if the 47 A>B voters vote B>A, then B is the Condorcet winner. Notably, there is no way for any other voter to improve the outcome for themselves (the A>B preferring voters can't make A CW and neither can the C>B preferring voters), so B is a strategically stable winner. Using AAV along with a cycle resolution method that would elect C would automatically elect B because of this. This step might be usable solely to shrink the Smith Set at times rather than find a single strategic CW.
But note that with a Condorcet cycle of <blockquote>1 A>B>C
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