Algorithmic Asset Voting: Difference between revisions
→Example
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Some optional assumptions are:
* When a negotiator is indifferent between certain outcomes (i.e. because their voters equally ranked those outcomes), they use their assets to help pick the socially best of those outcomes. As an example, if the voters cast rated ballots <blockquote>49 A5 B4 3 A5 B5
*
*
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'''26 A
'''26.5 C
'''26.5 D'''
21 S
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If there are 51 voters who prefer Party A and 49 for Party B, then in a 5-winner election, the 49 B voters can always ensure two of their candidates are in the final winner set.
Chicken dilemma:
{| class="wikitable"
!Number
!Ballots
|-
|34
|A>B>C
|-
|25
|B>A>C
|-
|40
|C
|}
C has the most 1st choices, so A>C preferring voters could shift their votes to A, at which point no voter can improve the winner. Note that if voters had shifted their votes to B to beat C first, then some special steps would need to be applied to elect the Condorcet winner A. <ref>https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/ewgjss/comment/fg2fd63</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
!Number
!Ballots
|-
|1
|A
|-
|34
|A>B>C
|-
|25
|B>A>C
|-
|40
|C
|}
<br />
== Explanation of how Asset Voting is, under certain assumptions, a Condorcet method (and how this enables it to be done as an algorithm) ==
[[File:Asset Condorcet Winner example modified.png|thumb|400x400px|Algorithmic Asset to elect a Condorcet winner. ]]
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