Approval voting: Difference between revisions
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In FPTP, most A-top voters would likely support B instead, to avoid electing C. But with Approval, they can support both A and B, and if a few C-top voters support A as well, then A will win. This is also an example of averted [[Center squeeze effect|center squeeze effect]].
However, there is potential for what is known as the [[Chicken dilemma|chicken dilemma]], where one majority
Approval voting is also called set voting or unordered voting, because a voter expresses on their ballot the set of candidates that they prefer above all others, but is not allowed to rank (order) the candidates from 1st to 2nd to 3rd to... to last. In other words, it only allows voters to rank all candidates either 1st or last.
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The Approval voting winner is also always someone from the [[Smith set]] if voters' preferences truly are dichotomous (i.e. they don't have ranked preferences, but rather, honestly only support or oppose each candidate).
Fully strategic Approval voting with perfectly informed voters generally elects the [[Condorcet winner]], and more generally, someone from the Smith set; this is because a plurality of voters have an incentive to set their [[Approval threshold|approval thresholds]] between the Smith candidate and the most-viable non-Smith candidate, resulting in at least the same approval-based margin as the Smith candidate has in their [[head-to-head matchup]] against the non-Smith candidate. A common argument for Approval>[[Condorcet methods]] is that when voters are honest, they get a utilitarian outcome, while if they are strategic, they at least get the CW. This not being as much the case with [[Score voting]] or [[STAR voting]], it is not possible to figure out who the CW is from Approval ballots, since only limited [[pairwise counting]] information can be inferred.
==See also==
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