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Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions

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Arrow's impossibility theorem (view source)

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(Rephrased to make more clear that normalization is not necessarily strategic, by moving strategic voting to a separate paragraph.)
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==Statement==
No [[Ordinal Voting|ordinal voting]] system can be designed that always satisfies these three "fairness" criteria:
#[[Pareto Criterion]]
#[[Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]]
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In addition, if the voters [[Strategic voting|vote strategically]], the first benefit is also lost.
 
===Caveats===
 
Subsequent social choice theorists have expanded on Arrow's central insight, and applied his ideas more broadly. For example, the [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] (published in 1973) holds that any deterministic process of collective decision making with multiple options will have some level of [[strategic voting]]. As a result of this much of the work of social choice theorists is to find out what types of [[strategic voting]] a system is susceptible to and the level of susceptibility for each. For example [[Single Member system | Single Member systems]] are not susceptible to [[Free riding]].
 
==See also==
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