Anonymous user
Asset voting: Difference between revisions
Move the text about variations to its own section, rather than complicating and distracting from the overview at the start of the article
(→Notes) |
(Move the text about variations to its own section, rather than complicating and distracting from the overview at the start of the article) |
||
Line 1:
'''Asset voting''' is used to refer to a voting system in which votes are considered as "assets" given to candidates. If no candidate gets more than the winning threshold (i.e., a majority, in the [[Single-winner voting system|single winner]] case; generally speaking, a [[Droop quota|Droop]] or Hare Quota), then the candidates can redistribute "their" votes to other candidates until a winner exists.
49 B ▼
10 C </blockquote>Candidate C can't prevent A from winning by denying them a Droop quota, since A has the most votes overall. ▼
Asset voting was invented in 1874 by [[w:Lewis Caroll|Lewis Caroll]] (Charles Dodgson), and independently reinvented and named by Forest Simmons and Warren Smith.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rangevoting.org/AssetCLD.html|title=Asset voting was invented by Lewis Carroll (Charles L. Dodgson)!|website=RangeVoting.org|access-date=2019-03-02}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|url=http://www.rangevoting.org/BlackCarrollAER2.pdf|first=Duncan|last=Black|title=Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=59|issue=2|date=May 1969|pp=206-210}}</ref>
Line 50 ⟶ 46:
This example is somewhat farcical, but in general, [[utilitarianism]] can be viewed through an Asset lens as negotiators only weakly pushing for some preferences. Asset may even be modelable as one of the cardinal PR methods when all negotiators' preferences are cardinal and not ranked. Also see the [[utility]] article for discussion on the connection between majority rule and utilitarianism. It is also worth looking into how negotiators can have weak preferences in some pairwise matchups but strong preferences in others, which all together could not be written on a rated ballot as a rated utility; see [[Rated pairwise preference ballot]] for discussion on this.
== Free-riding ==
Line 56 ⟶ 51:
Note however that free riding still can work if a voter honestly supports both a candidate with a small base and a candidate with the same small base combined with other bases, as the voter may wish to give their vote to the first candidate to elect them and hope the other bases will elect the second candidate, giving the voter two rather than only one of their preferred candidates. This type of free riding can lead to popular candidates losing to candidates equally preferred to them by smaller groups of voters if too many voters attempt it.
== Variations ==
Variations exist with different constraints on transfers - for example, the candidate with the fewest votes might be forced to redistribute their votes first. There need not be any threshold either i.e. for however many seats there are to be filled, for that number of candidates with the most votes, they are elected. This variation means that, in this single-winner example: <blockquote>51 A
▲49 B
▲10 C </blockquote>Candidate C can't prevent A from winning by denying them a Droop quota, since A has the most votes overall.
== Extensions ==
| |||