Asset voting: Difference between revisions
Added some clarification on the dubious claim in the last paragraph, as well as linked the terms "Smith set" and "Condorcet method".
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (dubious template, sounds like wishful thinking) |
(Added some clarification on the dubious claim in the last paragraph, as well as linked the terms "Smith set" and "Condorcet method".) |
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If used as a [[Voting systems#Multiple-winner methods|multi-winner voting method]], it obeys most [[proportionality criteria]], if the requisite assumptions about coalitions are extended to include candidates as well as voters. In such use, it is similar to [[delegable proxy]] systems except that, unlike such systems, it has public elections only at regularly scheduled intervals (proxies are not "revocable") and elects a fixed number of representatives with equal power.
Asset always picks a winner or winner set that is in the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] of negotiators' preferences (which is not necessarily the same as the voters' preferences, since the negotiators may be corrupt, change preferences mid-negotiation, not know the voters' full preferences, etc.) if the negotiators are given enough time to negotiate,{{Dubious|date=2019-12}} meaning that if the negotiators have discussed every relevant permutation of winners or winner sets, Asset will always produce an outcome that can earn more votes during the negotiations than any other possible outcome, unless certain outcomes earn more votes than each other in a [[Condorcet cycle]]. In the single-winner case, if the negotiators are honest, strictly follow voter preferences, and have enough time to negotiate, then Asset becomes a Smith-efficient [[Condorcet method]], and in the multiwinner case, resembles Condorcet PR methods such as [[CPO-STV]] and [[Schulze STV]].
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[[Category:Single-mark ballot voting methods]]
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