Asset voting: Difference between revisions
Added in mention of Algorithmic Asset.
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Sequential Asset Voting can be done by doing Asset sequentially in the multiwinner case: multiple rounds of negotiations are done, and after each round, the candidate(s) with the most votes are elected. If only one candidate is elected at a time, this can allow a majority to win every seat, and could be considered Bloc Asset Voting, as this is akin to deterministic Bloc methods such as Bloc Approval Voting. It is also possible to spend or exhaust some votes after each seat is elected, which can influence the negotiation and potentially make Sequential Asset move in a continuum between majoritarianism and proportionality. If a Droop quota of votes is spent each time, for example, then Sequential Asset becomes at least semi-proportional based on negotiator preferences.
Asset Voting can be done algorithmically on ranked or rated ballots when certain assumptions are applied, such as the ones mentioned above. One main assumption is that every negotiator attempts to maximize their own satisfaction with the outcome. When there is a Condorcet cycle of negotiating outcomes in this algorithm that would give a voter incentive for Favorite Betrayal in most Condorcet methods, it is sometimes possible to prevent that if a cycle resolution method is applied and the algorithmic negotiators are then allowed to change their preferences for candidates in the cycle. As an example:
|2|A>B>C|
|3|C>A>B|
|4|C=B>A|
|2|A>B>C|
All 3 candidates are in a Condorcet cycle. Schulze picks C, so suppose that is the default outcome if no negotiation occurs. Based off of this, the algorithm can flip the 4 A>B>C voters to B>A>C to help resolve the cycle and elect B, because this change in expressed preference benefits these voters' actual preferences. Not enough C voters would have an incentive to negotiate to change the outcome again, so B is the Algorithmic Asset winner here (if Schulze is used for cycle resolution).
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[[Category:Single-mark ballot voting methods]]
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