Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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Realized the "new way" of doing Bloc Asset doesn't work.
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'''Asset voting''' is used to refer to a voting system in which votes are considered as "assets" given to candidates. If no candidate gets more than the winning threshold (i.e., a majority, in the [[Single-winner voting system|single winner]] case), then the candidates can redistribute "their" votes to other candidates until a winner exists. Variations exist with different constraints on transfers - for example, the candidate with the fewest votes might be forced to redistribute their votes first. It is possible to force the negotiations to go on until there are enough candidates with quotas (say, Droop Quotas) to fill all (or all but one of the) seats, which in the single-winner case would, under the former condition, mean requiring the winner to earn a majority of assets.
Asset voting was invented in 1874 by [[Lewis Caroll]] (Charles Dodgson), and independently reinvented and named by Forest Simmons and Warren Smith.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rangevoting.org/AssetCLD.html|title=Asset voting was invented by Lewis Carroll (Charles L. Dodgson)!|website=RangeVoting.org|access-date=2019-03-02}}</ref><ref>[http://www.rangevoting.org/BlackCarrollAER2.pdf Duncan Black: Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games, The American Economic Review 59,2 (May 1969) 206-210]</ref>
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Asset can, under ideal conditions in the multiwinner case, render many if not all free-riding strategies needless; this is because, in some sense, the negotiators can do vote management themselves. Consider the example of three parties, A, B and C, where 51 voters vote for B candidates, 49 vote for A candidates, and 10 for C candidates, and there are 5 seats to be elected. Supposing every voter gives maximal support to all of the candidates of their chosen party, and no support for any other candidate, Party B will win 3 seats in most PR methods. However, if the 49 A voters divide themselves as evenly as possible between 3 of their candidates (17 of them bullet vote the first, 16 each bullet vote the second and third candidates), and a Droop quota is spent every time someone is elected in the PR method, then Party A will be able to win 3 seats instead. With Asset, the B candidates can agree to divide their 51 votes evenly between 3 of them (17 each), ensuring that their candidates will be 3 of the 5 candidates with the most votes when the negotiations end and thus win. <ref>[https://forum.electionscience.org/t/different-reweighting-for-rrv-and-the-concept-of-vote-unitarity/201/92]</ref>
Sequential Asset Voting is a tweak to Asset that can be done several ways. One is by doing Asset sequentially in the multiwinner case: multiple rounds of negotiations are done, and after each round, the candidate(s) with the most votes are elected. If only one candidate is elected at a time, this can allow a majority to win every seat, and becomes Bloc Asset Voting, which is akin to deterministic Bloc methods such as Bloc Approval Voting
Asset Voting can be done algorithmically on ranked or rated ballots when certain assumptions are applied, such as the ones mentioned above. One main assumption is that every negotiator attempts to maximize their own satisfaction with the outcome. When there is a Condorcet cycle of negotiating outcomes in this algorithm that would give a voter incentive for Favorite Betrayal in most Condorcet methods, it is sometimes possible to prevent that if a cycle resolution method is applied and the algorithmic negotiators are then allowed to change their preferences for candidates in the cycle. As an example:
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