Asset voting: Difference between revisions

Asset voting was invented in 1874 by [[Lewis Caroll]] (Charles Dodgson), and independently reinvented and named by Forest Simmons and Warren Smith.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rangevoting.org/AssetCLD.html|title=Asset voting was invented by Lewis Carroll (Charles L. Dodgson)!|website=RangeVoting.org|access-date=2019-03-02}}</ref><ref>[http://www.rangevoting.org/BlackCarrollAER2.pdf Duncan Black: Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games, The American Economic Review 59,2 (May 1969) 206-210]</ref>

 

 

Asset is Droop-proportional based on negotiator preferences (which can diverge from voter preferences), meaning that if a negotiator or group of negotiators hold a certain number of Droop Quotas of votes, they can guarantee the election of up to that number of their preferred candidates. Further, Asset always picks a winner or winner set that is in the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] based on negotiators' preferences (which is not necessarily the same as the voters' preferences, since the negotiators may be corrupt, change preferences mid-negotiation, not know the voters' full preferences, etc.) if the negotiators are given enough time to negotiate and are honest with each other in their negotiating moves,{{Dubious|date=2019-12}} meaning that if the negotiators have discussed every relevant permutation of winners or winner sets, Asset will always produce an outcome that can earn more votes during the negotiations than any other possible outcome, unless certain outcomes earn more votes than each other in a [[Condorcet paradox|Condorcet cycle]]. In the single-winner case, if the negotiators are honest, strictly follow voter preferences, and have enough time to negotiate, then Asset becomes a Smith-efficient [[Condorcet method]], and in the multiwinner case, resembles Condorcet PR methods such as [[CPO-STV]] and [[Schulze STV]]. The reasoning for this can in part be linked to the fact that Asset is an iterative voting method where the voters/negotiators are constantly updated on who is about to win if no change in votes occur, and they can therefore plan to defeat such candidates. Pairwise comparison is implicitly involved in this planning, as the negotiators must see if the candidates they prefer can obtain more votes from all negotiators than those who are about to win.