Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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'''Asset voting''' is used to refer to a voting system in which votes are considered as "assets" given to candidates. If no candidate gets more than the winning threshold (i.e., a majority, in the [[Single-winner voting system|single winner]] case; generally speaking, a Droop or Hare Quota), then the candidates can redistribute "their" votes to other candidates until a winner exists. Variations exist with different constraints on transfers - for example, the candidate with the fewest votes might be forced to redistribute their votes first.
Asset voting was invented in 1874 by [[Lewis Caroll]] (Charles Dodgson), and independently reinvented and named by Forest Simmons and Warren Smith.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rangevoting.org/AssetCLD.html|title=Asset voting was invented by Lewis Carroll (Charles L. Dodgson)!|website=RangeVoting.org|access-date=2019-03-02}}</ref><ref>[http://www.rangevoting.org/BlackCarrollAER2.pdf Duncan Black: Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games, The American Economic Review 59,2 (May 1969) 206-210]</ref>
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If used as a [[Multi-Member System|multi-winner voting method]], it obeys most [[proportionality criteria]], if the requisite assumptions about coalitions are extended to include candidates as well as voters. In such use, it is similar to [[delegable proxy]] systems except that, unlike such systems, it has public elections only at regularly scheduled intervals (proxies are not "revocable") and elects a fixed number of representatives with equal power.
Asset
Asset can, under ideal conditions in the multiwinner case, render many if not all free-riding strategies needless; this is because, in some sense, the negotiators can do vote management themselves. Consider the example of three parties, A, B and C, where 51 voters vote for B candidates, 49 vote for A candidates, and 10 for C candidates, and there are 5 seats to be elected. Supposing every voter gives maximal support to all of the candidates of their chosen party, and no support for any other candidate, Party B will win 3 seats in most PR methods. However, if the 49 A voters divide themselves as evenly as possible between 3 of their candidates (17 of them bullet vote the first, 16 each bullet vote the second and third candidates), and a Droop quota is spent every time someone is elected in the PR method, then Party A will be able to win 3 seats instead. With Asset, the B candidates can agree to divide their 51 votes evenly between 3 of them (17 each), ensuring that their candidates will be 3 of the 5 candidates with the most votes when the negotiations end and thus win. <ref>[https://forum.electionscience.org/t/different-reweighting-for-rrv-and-the-concept-of-vote-unitarity/201/92]</ref>
Asset Voting can be done algorithmically on ranked or rated ballots when certain assumptions are applied, such as the ones mentioned above (here is a [https://www.removeddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/eac87u/demonstrating_condorcet_pairwise_counting_with_an/ visualization] of the algorithm). One main assumption is that every negotiator attempts to maximize their own satisfaction with the outcome. When there is a Condorcet cycle of negotiating outcomes in this algorithm that would give a voter incentive for Favorite Betrayal in most Condorcet methods, it is sometimes possible to prevent that in Algorithmic Asset if a cycle resolution method is applied and the algorithmic negotiators are then allowed to
▲Asset Voting can be done algorithmically on ranked or rated ballots when certain assumptions are applied, such as the ones mentioned above. One main assumption is that every negotiator attempts to maximize their own satisfaction with the outcome. When there is a Condorcet cycle of negotiating outcomes in this algorithm that would give a voter incentive for Favorite Betrayal in most Condorcet methods, it is sometimes possible to prevent that if a cycle resolution method is applied and the algorithmic negotiators are then allowed to change their preferences for candidates in the cycle. As an example:
|2|A>B>C|
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|2|A>B>C|
All 3 candidates are in a Condorcet cycle. Schulze picks C, so
Asset Voting also has [[Sequential Asset Voting|sequential]] and Bloc versions of itself, which are generally less proportional and more majoritarian than regular Asset in the multiwinner cases. Both can be algorithmized as well.
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