Asset voting: Difference between revisions
Moved most of the discussion on Algorithmic Asset and the claim that Asset can follow the Smith criterion based on negotiator preferences to a separate article.
(Moved Sequential Asset and Bloc Asset to their own article, and made other edits.) |
(Moved most of the discussion on Algorithmic Asset and the claim that Asset can follow the Smith criterion based on negotiator preferences to a separate article.) |
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If used as a [[Multi-Member System|multi-winner voting method]], it obeys most [[proportionality criteria]], if the requisite assumptions about coalitions are extended to include candidates as well as voters. In such use, it is similar to [[delegable proxy]] systems except that, unlike such systems, it has public elections only at regularly scheduled intervals (proxies are not "revocable") and elects a fixed number of representatives with equal power.
Asset allows a negotiator or group of negotiators who hold a certain number of Droop Quotas of votes to guarantee the election of up to that number of their preferred candidates.
Asset allows a negotiator or group of negotiators who hold a certain number of Droop Quotas of votes to guarantee the election of up to that number of their preferred candidates. Further, Asset always picks a winner or winner set that is in the [[Smith set|Smith Set]] based on negotiators' preferences (which is not necessarily the same as the voters' preferences, since the negotiators may be corrupt, change preferences mid-negotiation, not know the voters' full preferences, etc.) if the negotiators are given enough time to negotiate and are honest with each other in their negotiating moves,{{Dubious|date=2019-12}} meaning that if the negotiators have discussed every relevant permutation of winners or winner sets, Asset will always produce an outcome that can earn more votes during the negotiations than any other possible outcome, unless certain outcomes earn more votes than each other in a [[Condorcet paradox|Condorcet cycle]], in which case one of those cycling outcomes will win. In the single-winner case, if the negotiators are honest, strictly follow voter preferences, and have enough time to negotiate, then Asset becomes a Smith-efficient [[Condorcet method]], and in the multiwinner case, resembles Condorcet PR methods such as [[CPO-STV]] and [[Schulze STV]] (these transformations can be observed by turning Asset Voting into an algorithm using various assumptions, as mentioned below). The reasoning for this can in part be linked to the fact that Asset is an iterative voting method (it is almost like an iterative version of FPTP; iterative voting methods are generally more Condorcet efficient than their non-iterative equivalents<ref>[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14]</ref>) where the voters/negotiators are constantly updated on who is about to win if no change in votes occur (i.e. which set of candidates of a size equal to the number of seats to be filled have more votes committed to them so far), and they can therefore plan to defeat such candidates. Pairwise comparison is implicitly involved in this planning, as the negotiators must see if the candidates they prefer over those about to win can obtain more votes from all negotiators than those who are about to win. ▼
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Asset can, under ideal conditions in the multiwinner case, render many if not all free-riding strategies needless; this is because, in some sense, the negotiators can do vote management themselves. Consider the example of three parties, A, B and C, where 51 voters vote for B candidates, 49 vote for A candidates, and 10 for C candidates, and there are 5 seats to be elected. Supposing every voter gives maximal support to all of the candidates of their chosen party, and no support for any other candidate, Party B will win 3 seats in most PR methods. However, if the 49 A voters divide themselves as evenly as possible between 3 of their candidates (17 of them bullet vote the first, 16 each bullet vote the second and third candidates), and a Droop quota is spent every time someone is elected in the PR method, then Party A will be able to win 3 seats instead. With Asset, the B candidates can agree to divide their 51 votes evenly between 3 of them (17 each), ensuring that their candidates will be 3 of the 5 candidates with the most votes when the negotiations end and thus win. <ref>[https://forum.electionscience.org/t/different-reweighting-for-rrv-and-the-concept-of-vote-unitarity/201/92]</ref>▼
▲Asset can, under ideal conditions in the multiwinner case, render many if not all [[Free riding|free-riding]] strategies needless; this is because, in some sense, the negotiators can do vote management themselves. Consider the example of three parties, A, B and C, where 51 voters vote for B candidates, 49 vote for A candidates, and 10 for C candidates, and there are 5 seats to be elected. Supposing every voter gives maximal support to all of the candidates of their chosen party, and no support for any other candidate, Party B will win 3 seats in most PR methods. However, if the 49 A voters divide themselves as evenly as possible between 3 of their candidates (17 of them bullet vote the first, 16 each bullet vote the second and third candidates), and a Droop quota is spent every time someone is elected in the PR method, then Party A will be able to win 3 seats instead. With Asset, the B candidates can agree to divide their 51 votes evenly between 3 of them (17 each), ensuring that their candidates will be 3 of the 5 candidates with the most votes when the negotiations end and thus win. <ref>[https://forum.electionscience.org/t/different-reweighting-for-rrv-and-the-concept-of-vote-unitarity/201/92]</ref>
Asset Voting also has [[Sequential Asset Voting|sequential]] and Bloc versions of itself, which are generally less proportional and more majoritarian than regular Asset in the multiwinner cases (with Bloc Asset, a majority can win every seat).
▲Asset Voting also has [[Sequential Asset Voting|sequential]] and Bloc versions of itself, which are generally less proportional and more majoritarian than regular Asset in the multiwinner cases. Both can be algorithmized as well.
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