Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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Asset Voting also has [[Sequential Asset Voting|sequential]] and Bloc versions of itself, which are generally less proportional and more majoritarian than regular Asset in the multiwinner cases (with Bloc Asset, a majority can win every seat). All of these various forms of Asset Voting can be [[Algorithmic Asset Voting|algorithmized]], and under certain (relevant) assumptions, become some type of Condorcet or Condorcet PR method.
Because the [[utilitarian winner]] can be thought of as a "weighted" [[Condorcet winner]], if the negotiators only use parts of their votes (like [[cumulative voting]]) to support their preferred candidates, then Asset may begin to resemble a [[Cardinal PR]] method. Single-winner example:
51 A:5 B:4
49 B:5
If Candidate A only gives himself 1/5th of his own votes to help himself beat B, or split his votes so that 5/9ths go to him and 4/9ths to B (in proportion to the difference in strength of preference), then B wins. This example is more farcical, but in general, [[utilitarianism]] can be viewed through an Asset lens as negotiators only weakly pushing for some preferences. Asset may even be modelable as one of the cardinal PR methods when all negotiators' preferences are cardinal and not ranked.
== References ==
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